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How to Activate a Power 
Jennifer McKitrick 
University of Nebraska–Lincoln
According to most views of dispositions or powers, they have “triggers” or ac-
tivation conditions. Fragile things break when they are struck; explosive things ex-
plode when ignited. The notion of an activation event, or “trigger,” is central to the 
notion of a disposition. Dispositions are defined not only by their manifestations, 
but also by their triggers. Not everyone who grumbles and complains counts as 
irritable—just those who do so with little inducement. Not everything that can 
be broken counts as fragile—just things that can be broken with relatively little 
force. The idea that triggers are part of the identity conditions of powers is evi-
dent in conditional analyses of powers, and even in the claim that certain condi-
tionals are typically true of things with certain powers. The antecedent of the con-
ditional corresponds to a trigger of that power: “If it’s struck, it will break” is true 
of a fragile thing, and “being struck” is the trigger. 
In this chapter, I explore the nature of activation events and their relation to 
the powers they activate. In particular, I will consider what triggers would look 
like if all properties were powers, as the dispositional monist or pandisposition-
alist tells us they are. While many have expressed worries about manifestations in-
volving instantiations of only dispositional properties, it is also worth noting that, 
on a pandispositionalist scenario, the activation event must be equally disposi-
tional. If all properties are powers, it seems that a triggering event must be an ac-
quisition of a power. But how does something acquiring a power activate another 
power to produce its manifestation? I suggest and evaluate possible answers. I 
will argue that, as with the case of manifestations, a vicious regress threatens the 
pandispositionalist picture of power activation. I go on to consider several possi-
ble pandispositionalist responses. 
1. Triggers 
The kind of thing I’m talking about goes by various names, such as “trigger,” 
“stimulus,” “circumstances of manifestation,” “activation conditions,” and “acti-
vation event.” I suspect that any distinction one might draw between the stimu-
lus and the background conditions is a matter of pragmatics. What counts as the 
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stimulus as opposed to the background depends on what’s salient to an audience 
in a context. In some contexts, a spark is a trigger for flammability. In other con-
texts, the availability of oxygen might be. Perhaps it’s best to think of the total set 
of circumstances necessary for the activation of a power as the  “circumstances of 
manifestation” or “activation conditions,” and the “trigger” or “stimulus” as a sa-
lient part of those conditions singled out for discussion. However, for simplicity, 
I’m going to use the expression “trigger” indiscriminately as a name for any part 
or whole of the circumstances of manifestation, and “activate” as a verb describ-
ing what a trigger does. In short, a trigger activates a power. 
You might say triggering a power produces its manifestation. So, if one wanted 
to analyze the relation between a power and its manifestation, one might do well 
to offer an analysis of production. But seeing as all parties to the debates that I 
am considering agree that powers produce their manifestations, I do not think 
that the nature of production is central to this discussion, and I will not attempt 
to analyze it here. My concern in this chapter is not so much the relation between 
a power and its manifestation, but rather the relation between a trigger and the 
power it activates. Since the existence of the power typically pre-dates its trigger, 
I do not think the relation between these two is one of production. 
What kind of thing is a trigger? Examples such as “dropping a glass” or “strik-
ing a match” suggest that they are events. When a power is activated, a certain 
event occurs which activates that power. This event is what I’m calling the pow-
er’s “trigger.” When one says that a power has a trigger, one usually means that a 
certain type of event tends to activate that kind of power. I am not assuming any 
particular account of events. Thinking of events as property exemplifications 1 is 
helpful, but not essential, to what I have to say about triggers. I am merely as-
suming that the occurrence of an event somehow involves the instantiation of 
some property. I’ll start with the assumption that when a trigger occurs, a new 
property is acquired, but also consider the possibility that merely having a prop-
erty may be sufficient to activate a power. 
Do powers necessarily have triggers? One might think that it’s part of the con-
cept of a power that it has a trigger. According to Andreas Hüttemann, “A dis-
positional property is a property that, if instantiated by an object, is manifest un-
der specific conditions only.”2 This suggests that a dispositional property must 
have a trigger. However, he goes on to say, “A categorical property by contrast is 
a property that, if instantiated by an object, is manifest under all conditions. So, 
according to this distinction categorical properties are limiting cases of disposi-
tional properties.”3 This suggests that  categorical properties are powers that are 
activated by anything and everything. But one could equally say that such pow-
1. Kim, Jaegwon (1976) “Events as Property Exemplifications,” in M. Brand and D. Walton, 
eds., Action Theory, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 159-177. 
2. Hüttemann, Andreas (2009) “Dispositions in Physics,” in Gregor Damschen, Robert 
Schnepf, and Karsten R. Stuber, eds., Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Episte-
mology and Philosophy of Mind, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, p. 3. 
3. Hüttemann (2009), p. 3.   
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ers do not need to be activated at all. If a power is constantly manifesting, there 
is no need for a trigger to activate that power. So, it seems reasonable to think of 
constantly manifesting powers as “trigger-less” powers. Notice, however, that to 
say that a power is constantly manifesting is not to say that it is constantly pos-
sessed, nor that the power is essential to objects that have it. Rather, it is just to 
say that an object manifests that power whenever it has that power. So an object 
could gain or lose a constantly manifesting power. 
Another possible trigger-less power is a spontaneously manifesting power. 
One might say that uranium has a disposition to decay, but no event activates that 
power; it just happens spontaneously. But even if there are powers that have no 
triggers, there may be some that do. These are the ones I’m going to focus on. But 
perhaps, in the end, the pandispositionalist will need powers without triggers.4 
2. Triggers for the Pandispositionalist (take one) 
The idea that all properties are powers has received a lot of recent attention.5 
A noted implication of pandispositionalism is that the manifestations of pow-
ers consist of acquisitions of further powers. Some have regarded this implica-
tion as problematic, leading to some sort of vicious regress.6 Similar worries ap-
ply to triggers as well. If powers producing nothing but powers is problematic, 
one would expect that powers being activated by nothing but powers to be prob-
lematic, too. Consider the following implications: 
T1. A power’s trigger is an event. 
T2. Events essentially involve something acquiring a property. 
T3. Therefore, a power’s trigger essentially involves something acquiring a 
property. 
T4. According to pandispositionalism, all properties are powers. 
T5. Therefore, according to pandispositionalism, a power’s trigger essen-
tially involves something acquiring a power.  
  
4. Stephen Mumford and Rani L. Anjum (2011) Getting Causes from Powers, and Barbara 
Vetter “Dispositions without Conditionals” (forthcoming) suggest that dispositions do 
not have triggers. Though they have independent motivations, perhaps this chapter 
will give them further reason to think that dispositions are not triggered by events. 
5. For example, see Bird, Alexander (2007) Nature’s Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford Univ. 
Press. 
6. For regress arguments against pandispositionalism, see Armstrong, David (1997) 
A World of States of Affairs, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press; Swinburne, Richard 
(1980) “Properties, causation, and projectibility: Reply to Shoemaker,” in L. J. Cohen 
and M. Hesse, eds., Applications of Inductive Logic, Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, pp. 
313-20. For replies, see Molnar, George (2003) Powers: A Study in Metaphysics, Stephen 
Mumford, ed. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press; Bird, Alexander (2007) “The Regress of Pure 
Powers?” The Philosophical Quarterly 57, pp. 513-34; Mumford, Stephen (2009) “Passing 
Powers Around,” The Monist 92, pp. 94-111; and McKitrick, Jennifer (2010) “Manifesta-
tions as Effects,” in Anna Marmodoro, ed., The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding 
and their Manifestations, New York: Routledge, pp. 73-83. 
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So, a power being activated, resulting in its manifestation, is, on this view, a mat-
ter of something acquiring a power, thereby activating the first power to make 
something acquire yet another power. Putting things this way might already 
strike those without pandispositionalist sympathies as unattractive. But I think 
there are deeper worries. 
Let me introduce some terminology in order to try to avoid confusion. I’ll call 
the power to be activated the “target power” and the manifestation of the target 
power the “target manifestation.” I’ll call the power the acquisition of which acti-
vates the target power the “triggering power.” So, the view in question is that the 
target power is activated by something acquiring a triggering power, resulting in 
the target manifestation. If “power A” is the triggering power, and “power B” is 
the target power, power B is triggered by something acquiring power A, result-
ing in the manifestation of B, or the target manifestation. 
Let me try to further clarify the picture of power activation that I think is 
emerging. Suppose the target power is the flammability of some gasoline. One 
trigger for this power is striking a match close to the gasoline. If that event is 
a matter of something acquiring a power, perhaps the match acquires a power 
when it activates the flammability of the gasoline, resulting in a fire. But what 
power does the match acquire? If the gasoline’s flammability is “power B” in this 
case, what is “power A”? 
Perhaps the triggering power is the flammability of the match? Note that the 
match and the gasoline are both flammable. They have the same type of power 
but different tokens. The suggestion is that the gasoline’s token flammability is the 
target power and the match’s flammability is the triggering power. Casting some 
doubt on this suggestion is the fact that the match’s flammability is not a newly ac-
quired power, but one that the match had prior to the occurrence of the trigger. 
Another possibility is that the triggering power is the match’s power to ig-
nite gasoline. But even if we want to allow for such powers, this also seems like 
a power that the match already had; not a new power, just a newly activated 
power. Perhaps it would help to make a distinction between having a power A 
and having a power to acquire power A. I suppose one could say that the match 
did not, strictly speaking, have the power to ignite the gasoline prior to being 
struck, but that it had the power to acquire the power to ignite the gasoline. Now 
“the power to ignite the gasoline” is a newly acquired power, and can perhaps 
play the role of triggering power. 
Note that whether a property is a considered (a) a triggering power, (b) a tar-
get power, or (c) a power of the target manifestation, is a relative matter. “The 
power to ignite gasoline” is: (a) a triggering power, relative to the flammability 
of the gasoline; (b) a target power, relative to the power of the striking surface to 
light matches; and (c) a power of the target manifestation, relative to the match’s 
power to acquire the power to ignite gasoline. To consider a different example, 
“being magnetic” could be (a) a triggering power, relative to the dispositions of 
things that are attracted to magnets, (b) a target power of magnetic things that 
can be activated by the proximity of metal objects, and (c) a manifestation of mag-
netizability—the disposition to become magnetic. 
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So, according to the suggestion under consideration, the match starts off 
with flammability (or perhaps the power to acquire the power to ignite the gas-
oline) and then the match is struck, thereby acquiring the power to ignite the 
gasoline. The acquisition of this power is the trigger which activates the target 
power (the gasoline’s flammability) resulting in the target manifestation (the 
gasoline burning). This strikes me as a prima facie plausible account of power ac-
tivation for the pandispositionalist. 
However, I think trouble arises for the pandispositionalist when one asks: 
Is it possible for something to acquire a triggering power without manifesting 
it? Is it possible for the match to possess the power to ignite the gasoline with-
out activating the gasoline’s flammability and starting a fire? If this power is 
acquired merely by the match being struck, it seems that it can be possessed 
without manifesting. A match can burn without igniting some gasoline, for all 
sorts of reasons. Perhaps if the power to ignite the gasoline is acquired only in 
ideal conditions—that is, conditions ideal for igniting gasoline—the power can-
not fail to manifest. But I am not sure that we want to say that when a trig-
ger occurs, something acquires a sure-fire power to activate another power, and 
that the match’s power cannot fail to activate the gasoline’s flammability, re-
sulting in combustion. Sometimes a trigger occurs, but something such as a gust 
of wind interferes with the target power being activated. Perhaps we could say 
that the struck match is just part of a potential circumstance of manifestation, 
and we need all the other factors to come together to produce the target mani-
festation. However, given a seemingly infinite number of possible defeaters, it 
does not look like there is any set of circumstances that will guarantee the oc-
currence of a manifestation. 
So, it looks like it is more plausible to say that the triggering power might 
be latent, or dormant. (The distinction between an active and dormant power is 
simply this: an active power is currently manifesting, whereas a dormant power 
is not currently exhibiting its manifestation, though it could possibly exhibit 
its manifestation at some other time. For example, while the switch is off, the 
power of the light bulb to illuminate is dormant, not manifesting; when the 
switch is turned on, the bulb lights up, its power to illuminate is active and 
manifest.) If a trigger is a matter of something acquiring a power to activate 
a target power, even when the triggering power is acquired, it might be dor-
mant. So even after the match acquires the power to ignite gasoline, it could fail 
to light the gasoline on fire. This suggests that, if A is the triggering power and 
B is the target power, merely acquiring power A is not sufficient for activating 
power B: Power A must be manifest. 
As for igniting the gasoline, we might cite additional conditions such as the 
air being sufficiently oxygenated, the gasoline being nearby and accessible, lack 
of strong winds or rainstorms, etc. But recall that, on the view under consider-
ation, every feature of the activation conditions is a matter of something acquir-
ing a power. Perhaps the air being sufficiently oxygenated can be construed as 
the possession of a power, but I am not sure how to think of the proximity of the 
gasoline, or the absence of wind and rain, as the possession of powers. 
128   J .  M c K i t r i c K  i n  M e t a p h y s i c s  a n d  s c i e n c e  (2013) 
3. The Regress 
The intuition that some properties do not seem like powers is nothing 
new. What is more problematic is that the triggering power must not only be 
acquired, it must be manifest. It may be puzzling to think that acquiring one 
power can activate another power to manifest. It is utterly mysterious how the 
acquisition of a latent power could do the job. So, the triggering power must 
itself be manifest. Now, if the triggering power must be activated in order to 
manifest and activate the target power, there is a regress in the making. The 
trigger of the triggering power is itself an event. According to the view under 
consideration, this event is itself a matter of something acquiring a power. By 
the same reasoning, in order for this power to activate the triggering power, it 
must itself be activated. This regress can be employed in a reductio against pan-
dispositionalism as follows: 
R1. Suppose that, in order for a power to be activated, something must ac-
quire a triggering power. 
R2. Suppose that, in order for a triggering power to activate a target power, 
the triggering power must be activated. 
R3. It follows that something must acquire another triggering power in or-
der to activate the first triggering power. 
R4. Furthermore, in order for this second triggering power to be activated, 
something must acquire a third triggering power, and so on. 
R5. Consequently, in order for a power to be activated, infinitely many trig-
gering powers must be acquired and activated. 
R6. That is absurd. 
R7. Therefore, our suppositions must be rejected. 
It follows from the suppositions of the argument (R1 and R2) that, for any 
power B, in order for B to be activated, some power A must be activated. Plug 
that principle in to power A’s activation, and the regress begins. Consider the 
sequence of events that must occur in order to activate the gasoline’s flamma-
bility. Suppose striking a match is the trigger. The striking occurs at t l , and the 
gasoline catches on fire at t n. On the view under consideration, in order to acti-
vate the gasoline’s flammability, the striking must involve something acquiring 
a power. Perhaps the match acquires the power to ignite the gasoline at t1. In 
order for that power to activate the gasoline’s flammability, it cannot be latent-
it must itself be activated. The activation of the match’s power to ignite the gas-
oline is itself an event, which must occur after the triggering power is acquired 
at t l. So the triggering power is itself activated at t2, say. On the view under 
consideration, this second trigger must also be a matter of something acquiring 
a power. I do not know what object acquires what power in this scenario, but 
in any case, the problem is that it seems like this power must also be activated. 
Therefore, there must be a trigger which occurs at some t3, and this trigger is it-
self the acquisition of a power, which itself must be activated, necessitating an-
other trigger, and so on. 
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4. Possible Replies 
An initial reaction one may have to this regress is that the pandispositionalist 
shares it with anyone who thinks that all causes have causes. If A causes B, and A is 
itself an effect, then A must have a cause as well, and that cause must have a cause, 
and so on. While one may wonder about the possibility of a chain of causes and ef-
fects stretching infinitely back into the past, this type of regress does not seem espe-
cially vicious. But even if it were, it would not put the pandispositionalist in “any 
worse position than anyone else who believes in a universal causal principle. 
This response would be fair if the regress I was worried about was that some-
thing having a power is itself the manifestation of an earlier power. So, if power B 
were the manifestation of power A, and power A were itself a manifestation of an 
earlier power, etc., there would be a chain of manifestations and the powers they 
were manifestations of stretching back into the past. Like the causal regress, such 
a regress may be harmless. 
However, the pandispositionalist picture of power activation I described dif-
fers from an innocent causal regress in several ways. Suppose that, in order for 
power B to manifest, a trigger must occur, and this event essentially involves 
something acquiring a power, call it power A. The acquisition of power A is 
the trigger for power B to manifest. It is not the case that power A brings about 
power B, or that power B is the manifestation of power A. Power B was already 
there, dominant. Something acquiring A is the event that activates power B to 
produce its manifestation. The question is not “where did power A come from?” 
but “how did it activate power B?” In other words, how does something acquir-
ing a triggering power result in something manifesting a target power? What is 
puzzling to me is not what comes before the trigger, but the process that is sup-
posed to commence upon the acquisition of the triggering power. 
The regress is not a matter of powers being activated by powers that were ac-
tivated by powers. Rather, it is a matter of infinitely many triggers needing to oc-
cur in order to bring about the manifestation, with the result that we never seem 
to get there. The problem is not that there are potentially infinitely many trigger-
ing events before the striking at t1. It is that we seem to need infinitely many trig-
gering events between the striking at t1 and the gasoline fire at tn. To see this, note 
that the striking is the acquisition of the triggering power at t1. Since a power 
cannot be activated until it is acquired, the activation of the triggering power 
must occur between t1 and tn. Let’s call that time t2. If the activation of the trig-
gering power is the acquisition of power that must be activated, this activation 
must occur sometime t3 which is after t2, but before the target manifestation at 
tn. (t3 cannot occur before t2. t2 is the time that the first triggering power is acti-
vated, that is, when the second triggering power is acquired. t3 is the time that 
the second triggering power is activated. A power cannot be activated before it 
is acquired. Therefore, t3 cannot occur before t2.) If the activation of the second 
triggering power happens at t3, that is an acquisition of a power that must be acti-
vated sometime between t3 and tn and so on. 
One way to break out of this regress is to deny (R1)—that a trigger is the ac-
quisition of a power. The pandispositionalist cannot say that a trigger is an acqui-
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sition of some nondispositional property, but perhaps he can say that an activa-
tion event is a matter of continuing to have a power. If an event merely involves 
an object having a property at a time, a trigger can occur without something ac-
quiring a new property. Does this help? 
Let us reconsider the activation of the gasoline’s flammability. Let us suppose 
that this does not have to be a matter of the match acquiring a new property; 
it is acceptable if the triggering power is a power that the match had all along. 
However, if this power needs to be activated, there needs to be another trigger. 
In accordance with the current suggestion, this trigger could also be a matter of 
something maintaining one of its powers. However, if this power must also be ac-
tivated, the regress still looms. Whether a trigger is a matter of acquiring a power 
or maintaining one does not seem to matter. 
There is further reason to reject the idea that a trigger is a matter of maintain-
ing a power, rather than acquiring one. If merely having the power were enough 
to activate a target power, there is no clear reason why the target manifestation 
did not occur as soon as the triggering power was acquired. In our example, if the 
match retaining some power that it had prior to tl was an event that could activate 
the gasoline’s flammability, then it is not clear why the gasoline did not catch on 
fire prior to t1. It seems that even if the triggering power is not newly acquired, it 
at least needs to be newly activated. And again, if this second trigger is a matter of 
something having a power that needs to be activated, we have a regress. 
But, one may wonder, do we still have the same kind of regress? Perhaps if the 
triggering power only needs to be activated, then the regress looks more like the in-
nocent causal regress discussed above.7 Suppose again that the trigger occurs at t1 
and the target manifestation occurs at tn. The present suggestion is that the trigger-
ing power was instantiated prior to t1 but that it was recently activated. The prin-
ciple that a power must be acquired before it can be activated no longer mandates 
that the activation of the triggering power occurred after t1. So while there may be 
an endless chain of triggering events, it is no longer the case that they must occur 
between t1 and tn, and the picture looks like powers that were activated by previ-
ously triggered triggering powers, back into the past, which looks innocent enough. 
In response, consider when is the activation of the triggering power supposed 
to occur? If it occurs after t1, the situation is essentially the same as it would be for 
a newly acquired power. If it occurs prior to t1, then there is an unexplained de-
lay between the activation of the triggering power and the occurrence of the target 
manifestation. If it occurs at t1, then something activates the triggering power at the 
same moment that the triggering power activates the target power. And “that some-
thing” activating the triggering power is a matter of something activating another 
power, which of course must be activated as well. The result would be that a trig-
gering event would require infinitely many powers being activated simultaneously. 
What seems to be causing the problem, then, is not whether the triggering 
power is newly acquired; it is the triggering power’s need for its own trigger. 
7. Thanks to Landon Hedrick for this point. 
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This suggests that the way for the pandispositionalist to escape the regress is to 
deny (R2)—that a triggering power needs to be activated. So, according to this 
suggestion, what happens when the target power is activated is that something 
instantiates a triggering power, and without itself being activated, this triggering 
power activates the target power to exhibit its manifestation.  
  In other words, the suggestion is that the triggering power is what we called 
earlier a “trigger-less power.” Recall that there seem to be two kinds of trigger-
less powers: spontaneously manifesting and constantly manifesting. Perhaps there 
are some cases where a trigger is a matter of something acquiring a spontaneously 
manifesting power. So, when a trigger occurs in certain circumstances, even if they 
are ideal, it is a stochastic matter whether the triggering power will manifest and 
activate the target power. But if determinism is true, or if there are some sure-fire 
dispositions that always manifest when activated in ideal circumstances, power ac-
tivation would still be problematic for the pandispositionalist in those cases. How-
ever, the pandispostitionalist can appeal to the other possible kind of trigger-less 
powers—constantly manifesting powers. A triggering power could be a power that 
does not need its own trigger because it is constantly manifesting. 
Now, the issue of whether a trigger involves acquiring a power or maintain-
ing a power arises again. If a trigger can be a matter of maintaining a power, 
and that power is constantly manifesting, then, again, there is no explanation of 
the time lapse between the acquisition of the trigger power and the target man-
ifestation. So, we are back to the view that a trigger must be a matter of acquir-
ing a power, with the new stipulation that it must be a constantly manifesting 
power, so no additional triggers are needed in order to the bring about the tar-
get manifestation. 
But recall what this means in terms of our original example. We already noted 
how a match can acquire a power to ignite gasoline without that power ever be-
ing manifest without the gasoline catching on fire. So, if the match acquires some 
constantly manifesting power, it cannot be the power to ignite the gasoline—that 
power might not manifest at all. So, if the match acquires some constantly mani-
festing power, it must be some other power. (Recall that an object can gain or lose 
a constantly manifesting power.) What power could it be? 
In the case of the match, an important property the match acquires is being 
on fire. Being on fire is often considered an occurrent property--something that is 
happening to the match now, not a matter of what it would do in certain circum-
stances. But recall Hüttemann’s view—that there is no real difference between 
a constantly manifesting power and a categorical property. So perhaps we can 
think of “being on fire” as a constantly manifesting power that is acquired when 
the match is struck. 
Note that the manifestation of the triggering power is not the same as the 
manifestation of the target power—the match being on fire is not the same event 
as the gasoline being on fire. This suggests that even after the triggering power is 
manifest, its work is not done, as far as bringing about the target manifestation 
is concerned. However, as we have seen, we do not want to say we need another 
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trigger to bring about the target manifestation. So we need a different account of 
how the triggering power helps to bring about the target manifestation. 
5. Triggers for the Pandispositionalist (take two) 
One alternative, which I think will be a welcome suggestion to some, is that 
the constantly manifesting triggering power contributes to the target manifesta-
tion. The other factors, such as the oxygenation of the air, the proximity of the 
gasoline, are not to be construed as triggers, but as co-contributors. We had been 
talking about the acquisition of the triggering power as the triggering event, but 
since it is the triggering power that contributes to the manifestation, perhaps it 
would be better to think of the power itself as the trigger. The picture that is now 
emerging is that when there is a confluence of a target power, a triggering power, 
and certain powers in their environment, they all jointly contribute to the mani-
festation. This picture now resembles Heil’s view according to which dispositions 
have mutual manifestation partners.8 When a disposition stands in the right rela-
tion to its partner(s), the manifestation ensues. 
Notice that, in this picture, there is little to distinguish a trigger from other 
powers that are needed for the manifestation. We have already seen that distin-
guishing a trigger from the total circumstances of manifestation seems to be a 
matter of pragmatics: We usually count the match’s power as the trigger, but the 
atmosphere’s being oxygenated is an equally qualified candidate. And we’ve al-
ready noted that the same power can be a triggering power relative to one power, 
and a target power relative to another: Recall that the power of the match to ignite 
the gasoline was a triggering power relative to the flammability of the gasoline 
and a target power relative to the power of the striking surface to light matches. 
Moreover, if powers are mutual manifestation partners, there is no principled 
reason to call one power a target and the other power a trigger. Which power 
counts as being targeted and which power counts as doing the triggering is an in-
terest-relative matter. We have been supposing that the match’s power triggers 
the gasoline’s flammability. But we could equally say that gasoline’s flammability 
triggers the match’s power to ignite flammable substances, or the atmosphere’s 
power to fuel fires, for that matter. 
So, if all properties are powers, what do triggers look like? Well, not surpris-
ingly, they look like powers. Triggers cease to be a category of much metaphys-
ical interest, above and beyond that of powers in general. A triggering power is 
just one of the powers which interact with other powers to produce a manifesta-
tion. I do not know if there is any significance to the concept of “interaction” on 
this view, other than to say that certain combinations and arrangements of pow-
ers result in the occurrence of the manifestation. There are all sorts of pragmatic 
reasons why one power might be singled out as a trigger. If a power is part of 
8. Heil, J. (2005) “Dispositions,” Synthese 144: 343-56. On the view I am describing, how-
ever, there will typically be more than two contributing powers. See also Mumford and 
Anjum (2011).    
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normal background conditions, its contribution to a manifestation might be taken 
for granted rather than noted as salient. Such is usually the case with local gravi-
tational fields or typical atmospheric conditions. However, if a power is newly in-
troduced into a situation, it is more apt to be considered a trigger. Moreover, if 
a power is the last power acquired before the assembled powers culminate in a 
manifestation, that power is likely to be called a trigger.9 But the fact that a power 
is new, or the final contribution to the manifestation, does not mean that it is a 
different kind of thing than any of the other powers that contribute to the mani-
festation. The answer to the question “how does a pandispositionalist activate a 
power?” is: He brings it together with all its mutual manifestation partners.  
To summarize, the possibility that survived the regress discussion was that 
triggers must be trigger-less. In particular, they must be constantly manifesting. 
This suggestion raised the question as to how these constantly manifesting trig-
gering powers can be active, and yet not guarantee the occurrence of the target 
manifestation. The answer to that question is the view currently under consider-
ation, that the triggering power needs its mutual manifestation partners in order 
for the target manifestation to occur. On this metaphysical picture, even a relative 
distinction between triggering powers and target powers is merely pragmatic. 
6. Remaining Doubts 
The picture according to which a trigger is one of the powers which gets to-
gether with other powers to produce a manifestation suggests there is no real role 
for activation. Powers are inherently active, making their contributions, and all 
one needs to do is to combine them to get a manifestation. But is there ever a 
sense in which powers are inactive, in addition to being insufficient for a certain 
effect? Perhaps the flammability of the gasoline that is just lying on the ground in 
a puddle is not making any contribution towards a fire yet. The sulfur on the tip 
of the match that is tucked away in a match book-its power seems dormant too. 
The idea that both of these powers are making their small contribution to the fire 
before the match is even struck seems odd. The fragility of the intact glass, the 
dark light bulb’s power to illuminate, the soporiferousness of the sleeping pill 
still in its bottle—these all seem like dormant powers. 
Remember, dispositional monism is the view that all properties are powers, 
not necessarily that all properties are active powers. On some views, the pos-
sibility of not manifesting, or being manifest in certain circumstances only, is 
what distinguished dispositions from other properties. If there is no clear dif-
ference between a categorical property and a constantly manifesting power, 
there is no clear difference between the view that all properties are constantly 
manifesting powers and the view that all properties are categorical properties. 
If dispositional monism is a real alternative to categorical monism, it should al-
low for dormant powers.  
9. Here, I am following Mumford and Anjum (2011), p. 37.  
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 If powers jointly produce manifestations, these powers need to be active. 
The question of how to activate a power does not arise for powers that are al-
ready active. But it seems possible that some powers are sometimes dormant. 
And a dormant power cannot contribute anything to a manifestation unless it 
is activated. But how does that happen? The answer under consideration seems 
to be that we add its co-contributors to the mix. But if an inactive power cannot 
contribute, it is not a contributor, and therefore has no co-contributors. More to 
the point, positing contributing powers does not explain how a dormant power 
becomes active. 
7. Triggers for the Pandispositionalist (take three?) 
There is another option for the pandispositionalist. The view that “powers 
contribute to manifestations” should be distinguished from another view, asso-
ciated with Molnar, Cartwright, and others.10 Such views note that most events 
are not manifestations of a single power, but are instead the result of complex in-
teractions between multiple powers. According to Molnar, a power is one thing, 
its contribution is another thing, and the actual effect is yet a third. Accordingly, 
we should distinguish between a power, its manifestation, and the effect that oc-
curs. In a similar vein, Cartwright favors a tripartite distinction between a capac-
ity, its exercise, and the manifest result. For example, perhaps the manifestation 
of “gravitational mass” is “gravitational force,” and that force contributes to the 
movements of bodies, along with all of the other forces present in any particu-
lar set of circumstances. On these views, it is not the power that contributes to an 
effect; rather, the capacity’s exercise, or the power’s manifestation, is the contri-
bution. In what follows, I’ll adhere to Molnar’s terminology, according to which 
“powers” have “manifestations” that contribute to “effects.” 
Where are triggers in this picture? A trigger is no longer one of the powers 
that contribute to an effect, since it is the power’s manifestation, not the power it-
self, which contributes to the effect. Perhaps one of the powers whose manifesta-
tion contributes to the effect could still be called a trigger. Keeping with an ear-
lier suggestion, perhaps the power whose manifestation is the final contribution 
to the effect is apt to be considered a trigger (the only difference from the earlier 
view being that the power is distinguished from the contribution it makes). This 
picture is slightly more complicated, but the role for the triggering power is es-
sentially the same. While the triggering power does not contribute to the effect 
directly, its manifestation does. 
10. See Molnar (2003) and Mumford (2009) for defense of the view that manifestations are 
contributions to effects rather than effects themselves. See McKitrick (2010) for criticism. 
See also Cartwright and Corry in Handfield, T. (2009) Dispositions and Causes, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. I am not saying that these views about exercising powers are 
offered in service of pandispositionalism, but that they can be put to that end. 
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However, there is still the issue of the relationship between a power and its 
manifestation (keeping in mind that a power’s manifestation is something that 
contributes to an effect, rather than being an effect itself). Some powers might 
manifest constantly, as is perhaps the case with massive objects which constantly 
exert gravitational force. Some powers manifest spontaneously. But perhaps 
there are some powers that are such that, not only do they have certain effects in 
certain circumstances, but they only manifest in certain circumstances. If so, there 
are times at which such powers are not manifesting, and need to be activated to 
produce their manifestations. 
So, this third take on power activation for the pandispositionalist is subject to 
essentially the same worries expressed about the second take. If powers are always 
manifesting, while combining those manifestations to get a resultant effect is surely 
an intriguing and at times complex process, there is no need for activation. How-
ever, if any powers are ever dormant, any story about combining manifestations 
will not explain how they get activated. This suggests that when such a power has 
a manifestation that contributes to an effect, there is another element of this sce-
nario—a trigger. Are we any closer to understanding the nature of this trigger? 
8. Conclusion 
A power must be active in order to contribute to an effect, or to have a man-
ifestation that contributes to an effect. While a power is dormant, it contributes 
nothing, and has no manifestation to contribute. If any powers are ever dormant, 
either (a) they stay that way, (b) they manifest spontaneously, or c) something 
happens that activates them, i.e. a trigger occurs. Before such a trigger occurs, 
the target power is a dormant power. We have discussed a sense in which any 
power that contributes to an effect can be considered a target power. But on sec-
ond thought, there is no need to activate powers that are already active and mak-
ing their contributions. I submit that there is a more central sense of power acti-
vation, according to which a target power must be a dormant power. 
So let us return to the view that, when a trigger occurs, something acquires a 
property, and for the pandispositionalist, this property must be a power. And it 
must be manifest. If the triggering power were dormant like the target power, it 
is not clear now it could do any triggering.11 Furthermore, if the triggering power 
were dormant, the triggering power would need its own trigger, and would itself 
be a target power, and of course, a vicious regress looms. So it looks like insofar 
as a power is playing the role of triggering power, it must be active. 
11. I suppose it is possible that a manifestation could result from two latent powers coming 
together. Perhaps a manifestation results from the collusion of two dormant powers in 
accordance with some law of nature. I see two difficulties for the possibility. This expla-
nation of power activation may interfere with another desiderata of the powers theorist-
reduction of laws to powers. And relatedly, it is not clear why these properties should 
be thought of as powers rather than categorical properties governed by laws. Thanks to 
Luke Elwonger for this suggestion.  
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So now we do have a metaphysical distinction between a target power and a 
triggering power: When a power is a target power, it is latent, dormant, not man-
ifesting; when a power is a triggering power, it must be active, exercising, man-
ifesting. And so there is no unexplained delay between the trigger and the man-
ifestation, the triggering power must be recently acquired or recently activated. 
We do not want to say that all triggering powers are activated just prior to the oc-
currence of the target manifestation, if that means they needed triggers, due to by 
now familiar regress concerns. I think, also, we do not want to say that the trig-
gering power manifests spontaneously because (a) we do not want to presuppose 
indeterminism, and (b) our own abilities to activate powers (light matches, re-
move stains, make phone calls, etc.) are too reliable to be purely chancy affairs. 
So, it looks like the best account of triggers for the pandispositionalist is that they 
are a matter of acquiring constantly manifesting powers not far in advance of the 
occurrence of the target manifestation. 
One might wonder if another regress looms. If the power is newly acquired, 
what caused it to be acquired? Was yet another power needed to bring about the 
instantiation of the triggering power? But if there is a regress here, I think it is 
akin to the innocent causal regress discussed earlier. In a pandispositionalist sce-
nario, the instantiation of a triggering power is a manifestation of another power 
that was activated previously, just as the cause of an effect is itself an effect that 
was caused by an earlier cause. 
There was also concern over the fact that a triggering power does not guaran-
tee the occurrence of the target manifestation, even when the triggering power 
is itself manifest. And if something else is needed, it had better not be another 
trigger. But perhaps there are aspects of the views considered that we can retain 
and make use of. The activation circumstances might be multi-faceted, involving 
several different triggering powers. The presence of one constantly manifesting 
power might not be sufficient, and other powers are needed to contribute and ac-
tivate the target power. 
Or, it might be that the triggering power has successfully activated the target 
power, and the target power is now contributing its manifestation, but the pres-
ence of co-contributing manifestations is insufficient to produce the expected ef-
fect. Note that when employing the Cartwright/Molnar tripartite distinction, we 
must watch for ambiguous references to “manifestations.” The triggering power 
may be constantly manifesting, and it might get the target power to manifest, but 
they might fail to jointly result in what we have been calling the “target manifes-
tation” if that is, in fact, an effect that would result from the complex interaction 
of multiple contributions. 
If there are dormant powers that do not manifest spontaneously, they need 
triggers. And to avoid a regress, they need triggers that do not need triggers 
themselves. So, I suggest, the pandispositionalist needs constantly manifesting 
powers to trigger dormant powers. But is there any difference between a con-
stantly manifesting power and a categorical property? It would be ironic if the 
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only way a pandispositionalist can activate a power is by positing what is effec-
tively a categorical property. If the pandispositionalist accepts my solution, has 
he in effect compromised his pandispositionalism?  
Again, I think it depends on what we mean by “manifestation.” If there were 
such a thing as a constantly manifesting power to be cubicle, for example, I 
would be hard pressed to explain how that is any different than the categorical 
property of being cubicle. But what if a manifestation is not a state of affairs like 
being cubicle, but something less tangible, like the force of gravity? What if con-
stantly manifesting powers have manifestations that are forces, not effects? It is 
not clear that there is any place for such a constantly manifesting power in a cat-
egorical monist ontology. Its manifestation seems insufficiently categorical. So, if 
pandispositionalism is true, even if a trigger of a power is a constantly manifest-
ing power, it will be distinguishable from a categorical property, since the mani-
festation is itself the instantiation of a power. 
In sum, I have considered several accounts of triggers for the pandisposi-
tionalist: acquisitions of dormant powers, activations of dormant powers, acqui-
sitions’ of spontaneously manifesting powers, acquisitions of constantly man-
ifesting powers, powers that contribute to a manifestation, and powers whose 
manifestations contribute to effects. I have noted what I take to be drawbacks to 
each approach. While I tend to favor thinking of triggers as acquisitions of con-
stantly manifesting powers, I leave it to the pandispositionalists to determine 
which approach works best in their ontology, and to live with or overcome the 
drawbacks I have highlighted, or to present an alternative account of activation I 
have yet to consider.
